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Much of the opposition to indexation as a means of adapting to ongoing
inflation arises from the view that indexation is itself inflationary.
This paper examines the basis for that view in a simple macroeconomic
model in which budget deficits are in part financed through the printing
ofmoney. Itis shown that all aspects of indexing——wage indexation, bond
indexation,and tax indexation——tend to increase the impacton the price
levelof any inflationary shock. However, this association between index—
ationand inflation is inlarge part a consequence of the monetaryand
fiscal policies being followed by the government.
Evidence from a cross—section of forty countries on the effects of
indexation on the inflationary impact of the oil price shock of 1974 sug-
gests that indexation did not in general increase the inflationary impact
of the oil shock. However, the impact of the oil shock was significantly








The main reason governments are reluctant to adopt price indexation
in their own transactions and encourage its use in the private sector is
that indexing is thought to be inflationary) The arginent is that an indexed
economy inflates nore, and nore rapidly, in response to an inflationary
shock than does a non—indexed economy, given the nonetary and fiscal policies
being followed. It is also argued that the will to fight inflation is
weakened when the costs of inflation are reduced by indexing -equivalently,
that the adoption of indexing affects the choice of policies.
The question examined in this paper is whether indexing is inflationary.
Section I reviews a simple nodel that has previously been used to examine the
effects of wage indexation on the price level and level ofoutput. Then in
Section II the nde1 is expanded to include the governmentbudget. Deficits
are assumed to be financed in part through the printing ofhoney. It is shown
that all aspects of indexing--wage indexation, bend indexation, ar tax
indexation-—tend to increase the impact on the price level ofany inflationary
shock. However, this association between indexation and inflation is inlarge
part a consequence of the rtonetary and fiscal policies being followed by the
government.
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1. ?inother reason for government reluctance to indek, which appliesparticularly to indexation of the taxation of returns on capital, is that it iscomplicated. While this is no doubt true, the right question to ask is not whetherperfect indexation is possible, but rather whether 'xrkab1eimperfect indexing is better than none at all.-2—
Evidence fran a cross-section of forty countries on the effects of
indexation on the inflationary impact of the oil price shock of 1974 suggests
that indexation did not in general increase the inflationary impact of the
oil shock. However, the impact of the oil shock was significantly stronger
in those countries that had adopted hond indexation.
I. Review.
There ale at least to distinct senses in whichindexingmight be said
tobe inflationary. First, the impact on the price level of any given inflation-
ary disturbance might be larger in an indexedthan ina non-indexed econany.2
It is probably in this first sense that it is camDnly argued that indexingis
inflationary. Second, the average price level or inflation rate might be
higher in an indexed thanina non-indexed econarty,given the nonetary and
fiscal policies being followedandthe distribution of the disturbances
affecting the econany.
Earlier United States literature on the effects of indexation on
stabilitycenteredon the relationship between wageindexation andthe
variabilityof output and prices (Gray 1976, Fischer 1977, andBlanchard
1978). The conclusion on the price side wasthatwage indexing speeds up
the transmission of shocks to the price level implying thatwageindexing
isinflationary in the first sense. Given the assumed constancy of the ironey
stock, the extent of wage indexing has no effects on the average price level
or inflation rate, implying that wage indexing is not inflationary in the
second sense.
2. If indexing is inflationary in the first sense, then a deflationaryshock
produces a larger impact on the inflation rate in an indexed than in a non—
indexed system. It was in this context of deflationary policy that the virtues
of Brazilian style indexation were stressed forU.S. audiences byFriedman (1974).—3—
Thesimplest rrodel with which -toderitnstrate these conclusions consists
of a wage sctting ecjuation3
(1)w + +u,
an outp.it supply function
(2)YtY(Pt.-wt)+vt,
and an aggregate dand euation
(3) mp+y+z
•Lower case letters are deviations of therelevant variables from
steady state values; w is the wage rate,p the price level, y real
output, rn the money stock, u, v, and z aremutually and serially
uncorrelated disturbances. The notation denotes the expectation
of Pt based on information availableat time (t-l). The parameter
5 represents the extent ofwage indexation; for ô=l, the wage is
indexed, and for O the wage isentirely predetermined.4
The aggregate supply functionisderived from (1) and(2):
(2)' y(l—6) (Pt - - +
Vt.




3.The model is beEthought ofas the linearization around the steady state of an underlying model
set up in Appendix 1, with the steady state money stock,wage rate and price level set at unity by choice of units.
4.In Fischer (1977) I noted thatwage indexation is typically a means of making mid—contractadjustments to wage rates rather than a mechanism that adjustswages to make ex post payments to workers for inflation that hasalready occurred. For that reason it is
desirable to model wage indexatjonusing multi_period contracts. The concentration on singleperiod contracts in thispaper is for the sake of simplicity.—4—
Equation (4) shows that the effccts of any inflationary disturbance
(an increase inu, representing a wage push, a decrease in v, representing
an adverse supply shock, or a decrease inz, representing a reduction in the
danand for nney or increase in aggregate dand) on the price level islarger,
the larger is e.And0 is clearly larger the irore the wage is indexed, or the
larger is 5. Thus the impact effect of any inflationary shock is larger when
there is wage indexing. Wage indexing is thereforeinflationary in the first
sense.
Under the assumption that the disturbances in the modelare white, it
is also clear from (4) that the extent of indexation hasno effect on the average
price level or inflation rate, and thus that wage indexing is notinflationary
in the second sense.
Three cczrments on equation (4) are in order. First, the varianceof. the
price level can be calculated from (4) and is
(5)0[yc+ cc+ c]
whereis the variance of x.
Since 0 increases with S, the variance of the price level is larger themore
wage indexation exists; the conclusion that wage indexing destabilizes the
price level is thereby demonstrated.
Second, this simplest model contains no dynamics. All effects of
disturbances are absorbed in the period the disturbance occurs. Ofcourse,
this is hardly a description of the real orld unless the period is made too
long to be interesting. In practice, wages adjust slowly, disturbances
affect inventories and investment, and so forth, and adjustment toa
disturbance is spread out over time. But there Is no reason to think that—5—
dynarnizing this model by including reasons for persistence would change the
basic result.
Third, it is clear thal if monetary policy can react within the current
period to disturbances, it can stabilize the price level caTipletely. All that
isnecessary is to set theterm in bracketsin (4) to zero.Althoughthere
is no explicit maximization underlying thismod, a case canbe made that
such a policy would be optimal. It would ensure no divergence between expected
and actual prices and would allow real side disturbances to have their full
impacton output. The level of output is:
(6) =(1-0)[mt_tim_z]e[1t_vt]
If monetary policy operates to keeptheprice level constant, so that
thenthelevel of output is given by
(6)'yt=_u+v
In (6)' beth u andvhave their fullimpact onreal output. Workers who
dariand ahigher real wage (when u rises) obtain thatrealwage, at the expense
of loweroutput,andany increasein productivity or other supply shock (when
Vrisesincreases output.
Whywould allowing such shocks to affect output bedesirable? The
argument,advanced initially by Barro (1976), is that the level of output is
optimal when markets clear without any expectations being disappointed and
information in that sense isperfect.The argiinent is suggestive, hut in the
present context, it cannot be more than that without explicit optimization.
It should be noted that the policy that produces (6)' destabilizes
real output--but the argument is that such destabilization is socially desirable.—6—
Note also that when monetary policy stabilizes the price level perfectly,
indexation is irrelevant to the behavior of prices, as should be expected.
1nything that indexation would do is done by nonetary policy.
The conclusion fran this surrrnaxy of the standard literature is that
wage indexing is inflationary in the first sense but not in the second sense.
A third sense in which indexation might be said to. be inflationary occurs
when indexation renders unstable a model that would otherwise be stable.5
No such instability is resent in the model of this section.
The stabilizing mechnaism in the present model can be viewed as
the real balance effect. Given the strict quantity theory formulation of
the demand for money, and the fixed money stock, any increase in prices
reduces aggregate demand and thereby stabilizes the price level. The first
sign of instability in a nxel of this type emerges when the demand for
money is. made a function of the nominal interest rate or expected inflation
rate, and (3) is amended accordingly. The inclusion of an IS carve, or
assumptions abeut the behavior of the real rate of interest, will close the
system. It is well known that there are in general many rational expectations
solutions for the price level in such a system, even given a constant nominal
money supply; only one of the paths is a stable path. Hcever -andthis
point bears emphasizing -thisindeterminacy/instability has nothing to do with
the presence or absence of indexation. It is therefore not discussed further
in this paper.
If indexing is to be inflationary in the third sense, in the context
of a simple model like that examined atove, it must be because it affects
5.Reflectionwill suggest that the third sense in which indexing can be
described as inflationary is a special case of the second sense.—7—
the rroney stock. The link will come throucjh partial or total financing of
budget deficits by the printing of nney and the interactions of the deficit
with inflation. Indexation affects the links 1x?ten the budget deficit and
inflation.
Those links between indexat ion and the rroney supply process are the focus
of the extension presented in this paper of the standard literature on indexing
and inflation. The major links arrong indexin, inflation, the budget, and
noney growth are:
1. If government debt is indexed, the nominal deficit reacts to actual rather
than previously expected inflation.
2. Indexation of wages and social security similarly ensures that the nominal
deficit reacts to the actual rather than the previously expected price level.
3.Taxindexation renoves the generally pesitive impact of higher prices on
real government revenue.
4. Indexation of interest on past tax obligations on the contrary makes real
government receipts less sensitive to the inflation rate.
5. Increases in the budget deficit are likely to be financed at least in part
through the printing of noney.
6. Since indexation makes inflation easier to live with, governments are nore
likely to adopt inflationary rolicies when the econonrj is substantially indexed.
The role of the first five factors in determining the relationship between
indexing and inflation is examined in Section II. Factor six is briefly discussed
in Section III. Evidence on the effects of indexing on inflation is presented
in Section IV, and concluding corrments are contained in Section V.—8—
II. Inducingthe Government Budget Constraint.
Theplicit assumptionin the standard analysis presented above
is that taxes and/or government spending are manipulated to maintain the
budget in balance. Alternatively, though less plausibly, it could be assied
that all deficits are financed by borrowing and that changes in the stock of
debt are viewed by the public as merely delayed taxation, so that budget deficits
are financed by future taxation.
The government budget deficit is financed either through the printing of
noney or by borrowing. Denote real government spending by Gt,nominaltaxes
by Tt, the nominal stock of government debt outstanding by Dt, and the nominal
interest rate by i. Assirne that all debt has a one-period maturity. Then




Assumingthat thereal interest rate (z). on indexeddebtis
the same as thaton non-indexed, the nominal interestrate payableby the
governmentin periodtis
(8) i =r+- +) -
whereis the proportion of the debt thatis indexed. The nominalinterest
payableonthe indexedportion ofthe debtisdeterminedonthebasisof actual
inflationand interest payable on the non-indexed portion is predetermined on
the basis of the expected rate of inflation.
Based on a linearization of the budget constraint (7), as described in
the Appendix, and assuming that taxes are proportional to incarie and that the
ratio of debt to rroney is kept constant, the change in the noney stock is
described by
(9)rn - = a -t-l+b(t_ip
- +cy + dpt+
a,b,>O, c<O, dO.—9—
The expressions for parameters a-Es are given in the Ippx3ndix. Frcxn (A7)
it may be seen that, given a positive stock of government debt, the parameters
a, b, andare positive. In increase in the extent of indexation of the
government debt increases a while reducing b. Parameter c is negative
(increases in the level of real income increase taxes and reduce the deficit).
It will be seen below that the parameter d is of decisive importance
for the stability of the system. Without indexation of taxes, d is likely
to be negative as increases in the price level increase taxes mare than
government spending. Or, if the tax system is indexed and nominal government
purchases are proportional to the price level, the sign of d depends on whether
the budget is in surplus or deficit. If the budget (exclusive of interest
payments) isin surplus, d will be negative. Butd may be positive,andwe
shallseethat the system then is unstable.
The full rrodel with which we are now wrk consists of equations (1), (2),
(3), and (9). The standard rrodel has been supplemented by the addition of an
hypothesis abeut the determinants of nney growth. We are interested particularly
in the effects of parameters a, b, and d in (9) on the stability of the price
level, and in possible interactions between the extent of wage indexing (the
parameter S) and the parameters of the rroney growth rule in determining the
response of the price level to disturbances.
The addition of the meney growth/deficit financing equation (9) will
affect the analysis of the effects of indexation in tw ways. First, the
inact effects of disturbances will now be different than they were in the
simple rrcdel where the rroney stock is fixed. Second, the analysis now contains
sane dynamics, in that disturbances that affect the noney supply today can be—10—
expectedthereby also to affect the money supply and thus prices in subsequent
periods.
Fran (2)', (3), and (9), we obtain the folling equation for the
detennination of the price level :6












=[l+y(l-c)-a-d]1, - ,yy(l-), e =e(l—X)
Tha first use of (10) is to discuss the impact effects of current supply
disturbances, e1, and dand disturbances, z, on the price level. These
impact effects are given by b3 and b5 respectively. Note that -v.
is treated as an aggregate supply side disturbance since an increase in
that increases wages has the same effect on prices as a decrease inv. that
decreasesaggregate output.
Considerfirst a unit decrease in z., an increase in aggregate




which is assi.med positive. Cczrtparing with 0 in equation (4), we note that
(b) In solving for (10) it is assumed that the rroney debt ratio M/D is constant
sod1 in (9) is equal to ((l_A)/X)mi, where A is definedin the—11—
the parameters a and d both increase theimpact effect of an inflationary
shock on the price level. Thepararreteraffects the price level in basically
the same way here as in the simplerirodel, except that now is multiplied by
(1—c). The interpretationof thechanges is simple. When the price level
increases in the current mxlel, therrcney stock will increase to an extent
that depands pasitively on a and d. Thusbond indexing, which means that
the budget deficit increases when thecurrent price level rises, and anything
else that reduces the inflationarydrag whereby inflation tends to put the
budget into surplus (and thus increases d), willincrease the impact effect of
inflationary disturbances on the price level. Asbefore, increases in the
extent of wage indexing which reducey, also increase the impact effects of
inflationary disturbances. Since an inflationary ncminaldisturbance tends
to increase output, the total impact effect ofa disturbance is reduced by
increased sensitivity of the budget deficitto the level of output, as
represented by the parameter c. Thus the conclusion is thatthe impact
effect of an inflationary daiiand side distrubanceon prices is larger the
nore indexing there is: this applies to wage indexing, to bondindexing
and, to the extent that tax indexation reduces inflationarydrag, also to
tax indexatiori.
Asimilar analysis with similar conclusion—that allforms of indexing
are inflationary in the first sense--applies in thecase of an adverse supply
shock. The effect is surimarized by theparaxroter b3. The only difference with
the analysis of the previous paragraph is thatnc the effect on prices is
larger the larger is (—c), i.e. the greater the effect ofchanges in output
on the budget deficit. The difference arises fran the factthab an inflationary
supply shock reduces output. The larger is c, thegreater the effect of the
output reduction on the budget deficit, therefore o therroney stock, and
therefore on the price level.—12—
Theresult so far is that all types of indexation are inflationary
in the first sense? The explanation for the effects of wage indexing on
the price level is the same as that in the trx1el of Section I; the effects
of bond and tax indexation follow from the link between the budget deficit
and rroney growth.
As noted previously, the addition of the deficit financing hypothesis
(9) adds dynamics to the simple rtix1el. We therefore turn next to the
dynamics of the effects of shocks on the price level, and to the role of
indexing in determining the magnitude of those effects. For that purpose,
the price level equation has to be solved explicitly, giving the price level
as a function of all current and past disturbances. Expectations are assumed
to be rational.
The solution will be of the form
(11)Pt =aet_1+
Asolution specifies the values of the parametersc and
In orderto rk with stochasticsteady states,it is necessaxythat there
be sucha state,equivalently that the process for the price level specified
by(10.)be stationary. There was no question in the simplest rrodel with its
ODnstant noney stock and white noise disturbances that the price level was
stationary. Here however itis quitepossible that the price level will not
be stationary. In such a case, the price level will not fluctuate arounda
7.Ifwages are not fully indexed, then increases in a and d increase the
effects of an inflationary nominal shock on output. Thus obviously not all
forms of indexing stabilize output in the face of nominal shocks. I do not
discuss output behavior further? leaving calculation of the effects of
disturbances on output for the interested reader.constant average level, butmayeither
else rrove around aimlessly in the same
To show this it is convenient to solve




explode in response to disturbances, or
general way as a random walk process.
for the parameters c andin (11)
z in (10) arid (11).
(1—b1) = + b2)i—li =2,3
If the price level is to be stationary, the weights ct andhave to







The parameters in (14)' relate to the rroney growth rule and are
independent of the extent of wage indexing. Further, since a and b do
not enter (14)', the existence of stationarity is independent of whether
the debt is indexed.8 Given a positive stock of debt e is positive. Thus
d, which represents the effects of the price level on the budget deficit, has
tobe negative ifthe price level is to be stable.
8.If itwasassed thattheindexeddebtcarriedalower realinterest










The reason for this instability is not hard to find. Suppese there
was a budgt deficit last period that increased both the money stock and the
debt. The budget deficit this period will tend to be larger than it ould
otherwise have been because a larger stock of debt has to be turned over.
The price level will tend to be higher this period because the money stock
is higher. Unless the higher price level reduces the budget deficit (i.e.
unless ci is sufficiently negative) the budget deficit this period will be
greater than last period' s, the money stock will increase again, and so an
unstable process is set in train. The view that indexing is inflationary
in the third sense receives minor suppert from the analysis aix)ve in that
indexation of the tax system vuld rve part of the fiscal drag associated
with inflation that, in this model, feeds back to stabilize the money supply
process.
•But it is clear that this petential instability has nothing to do with
the existence or non-existence of wage indexation and bond indexatioñ, so
long as both wages and interest adjust for expected changes in the price
level, as has been assumed. Of course, if inflation is a method of reducing
real wages or real interest, then indexation of wages and interest is more
likely to be inflationary in the third sense.
There is no great mystery in this model about how to rtove
this pessible instability. Fiscal pelicy has to be used to
offset the instability associated with money financing of deficits. This can
be ensured either by running a basic budget surplus (easier written than done)
or by varying tax rates in a counter—inflationary direction. The timing of
such adjusbiients of tax rates is not crucial, in that stability may still
obtain even if there is a lag in the respense of tax rates to the deficit.—15--
Is it possible that although the price level in sucha nodal is unstable,
the inflation rate is stable? That,mightit be the case that disturbances
produce terrqoraiy increases in the inflation rate thatultimately die down,
but are never reversed, with the result that theprice level is permanently
higher than it ould have been in the absence of the disturbances?With the
noney growth equation (9), such stability is not attained unless d isnegative.
The reason is that (9), as written, implies thatduring a process in which
the price level is rising, the real deficit increasescontinually if d is
positive. Since the increased deficit will have to be financedby an increase
in the growth rate of rrcney and throughdebt, the inflation rate too will be
unstable. If d is negative or even if taxesare adjusted with a lag to close the
deficit, the inflation rate may be stable. Thus the analysis of thestability
of the price level applies also to the stability of the inflation ratearound
its average.Deficit financing provides a destabilizing el-nent as it does
in the analysis atove. The conclusion is once again that sensible fiscal policy
to control nonetaxy policy will stabilize the syst, but that blind adherence
9 to rroney financing of the deficit will not.
We return now to the dynamics of the effects of disturbances on the
price level. We saw earlier that all forms of indexing increase the impact effect
of disturbances--whether derrend or supply side-on the price level in the period
they occur. The full dynamic effects of disturbances are specified by thec
9.iii- thenodel used acove, deficit financing through ]xnds is not formally
destabilizing for the price level, because th.e stock of governmentJonds is
not assumed to affect any of the behavioral equations. There are some nodels
in which such a conclusion is appropriate (Barro, 1974) but it is assumedin
thosecases that taxes will at some time be levied topay offthe debt. Less
isknown alout the irrpiications for behavior of an ever-increasing stock of
government debt, and I wuld not want to argue that there uld be no effects
on the price level from such a policy.—16--












Carefulexamination of (12)' and (13)' suggests that there are nosimple
relationshipsbetween the dynamic pattern of adjustment to disturbances and
the extent of indexation. This is in large part because the signsand
are indeterminate. For bathsupplyand dand disturbances, itisquite
likely that the price level overshoots its equilibriiin level intheperiod
after the shock.
Consider, for example, the expression forwhich gives theeffectof
an increase in Iassume that the rrcdel is stable so d is negative,
and also that (a+b) <1.Then Ct1willbe negative if
(15)(l+e) (a—c-Fd) —(1—c)(aTh) <0.
Thereare two sets of terms in(15).The first describes the impact of the
disturbance inperiodtonthe rioney stock in period tandthus in (t+1),
(this istheterm (a-c-fd)), as augmented by theneedto service theincreased
stock ofdebtin (t+l) (hence the (l+e) term). If the irodel isstable,(a-c+d)
is pssibly negative. The second set of terms involves the fact that the
disturbance that caused theinflationinperiodtis nolonger present—17—
in pericd (t+l). For that reason the price level isexpected to fall,and
the naninal interest rate adjusts downwards,reducing the needed amount of
debt servicing. Both sets of terms in (15)may be negative, in which case
there will certainly be overshooting of the price level, and theremay be
overshooting in any event A similar argnt will show why theremay be
overshooting of the price level after a dnand side disturbance, under which
circtmstances will be pesitive.
Althoughthere are no simple relationships between thedynamicpattern
ofadjusthent to disturbances and the extent of indexation, it should be
noted that all the coefficients in (12)' and (13) include theterm
and thus all are larger in absolute value thelarger the impact effect of
inflationary shocks on the price level. Thus the basic conclusionthat
inde.xation increases the impacteffecton the price level of an inflationary
shock--thatindexing is inflationary in the first sense--carries over also
to the lagged effects of the shocks.
In later periods the effects of the shock dieaway geometrically. The
rate of decay is slower the larger is (l-a--b+e)/ (1—a-b-d), theroot of the
systn. Since a and b enter the expression as (a+b), bond indexing hasno
effect on the rate at which the disturbances decay. Nor does theextent of
wage indexing. The reason is that the effectsof I+j t+2' etc.
are all anticipated oncebecomes known. These effects are thus reflected
in the wage and the interest rate even without indexation.
Figures 1 and 2 show the dynamic effects of supply and dandshocks
on the price level. An inflationary supply shock is shownas increasing the
price level in all but as noted above there may be overshooting in
this case. If so Figure 2 uld describe theadjustment pattern for a supply
shock too. In Figure2 aninflationary d€iand shock is shown increasing-17a-




Figure 1: Dynamic Effects of a Supply Shock.
Price
level
--..--- ---4--- ---..--.I -- Withindexatiori—18--
the price level in the current pericxl and reducing it in subsequent periods.
Also represented in the figures are the likely effects of
indexation on the magnitude of the price effects.
The results of this section show that all foims of indexing tend to
be inflationary in the first sense, given the assumed link between the budget
deficit and monetary growth. Prices will increase more in respanse to an
inflationary shock in an indexed than in a noi-indexed econany. The absolute
magnitudes of the lagged effects of the shocks are also larger the greater
the extent of indexing. Fran the viewpoint of the stability of the system,
the key issue is whether total taxes can be increased when the price level
rises. This effect is frequently known as the inflationary fiscal drag.
To the extent that indexing of the tax system tends to reduce the effects
of inflation on total government revenue, a stabilizing element is removed
fran the system and tax indexation may be said to be inflationary in the
third sense.
What should be made of these results? It does appear that indexing is
inflationary for both supply and demand side disturbances. But is must be
phasized that this result stems mainly f ran an assumption about government
policy, and particularly the money growth or fiscal policy rnle (9). In
this simple nxxel, monetary and/or fiscal policy can be used to offset the
potential inflationary effects--in both the first and third senses--of
indexation.
Whether indexing is inflationary is thus not a question that can be
answered a priori. The answer depends on the types of policy being followed.
If governments follow the type of monetary/fiscal policy described by (9),—19—
indexing is inflationary. ButthesepDlicies areamatter of choice arid
not necessity.1°
III. Further Considerations.
In this section I briefly discuss three issuessuggestedbythe analysis
ofSection II.
1. The Stabilizing Mechanism,Adjustment,and RationalExpectations.
Thestabilizing meáhanisrnsinthe Section II rrtdel are the real balance
effect and the rroney growth rule, in whichthefeedback parameter d is crucial.
The adjustment mechanism is one in which prices and wages are flexible, and
expectations are rational.Underthese curcumstances, adjustment to disturbanáes
isextremelyrapid.
The easy control over the price level that is petentiallyavailableto
rolicymaers in the Section II rrodel is doubtless unavailable in practice.
But thereisno reason to think that the basic result—-that indexat ion speeds
up the transmissionofinflationary disturbances to the price level--uld
be affected by the inclusion of sticky prices, (using a Phillips curve in
which unemp1omientisneeded to rrove wages) or slow expectations adjustment.
2. Mutual Causation.
Theprevious section analyzed the effects of indexation on inflation or
the price level for a given rronetary/fiscal pelicy and set of disturbances.
But there is also a reverse link, fran inflation to indexation.Ifan
inflationary process becomes established, the private sector will begin to
use indexation as a means of reducing the costs the inflation irnpeses on them.
And typically, if the inflation rate is high enough, the government will
10. The link between budget deficits arid money growth represented in
equation (9) certainly does not hold for all countries (D3rnbusch and
Fischer,1981).—20—
eventuallydo likewise. This reverse link is a potential problem in
empiricl rk, but it i not relevant to the question considered in Section II,
which is whether the presence of indexation, for whatever reason it was
introduced, is inflationary.
3. inarnic Inconsistency.
It has been argued that introducing indexation uld be a "confession
of failure"in the battle against inflation, a uld aiso weaken the will
to fight inflation. The confession of failure argimient, whichmay have been
plausible in the fifties is no longer attractive: there is no need for a
confession when the murderer is caught red-handed at the scene of the crime.
However, the argument that indexation ould weakenthe will to fight
inflation is not absurd. It is related to theproblem of dynamic
12
noDnsistencyin optimal control problems.The problem arises when a plan
that is optimal from the viewpaint ofa given date is no longer optimal at a
later date, even if no nq information hasarrived in themeantime.The
nostimpz)rtant case in which the problem can arise is in the short-run inflation-
output tradeoff. Because getting rid of inflation isa slow process in which
the costs are paid early, andsuccesscomes late if at all, the temptation
inany short run situation is to avoid contractingoutput even if that is
necessaryto reduce inflation. The plan u1d beto keep output constant row
and start the battle against inflation later,But of course when latercomes,
it is again not optimal in the shortrun to try to reduce inflation at the
cost of unemployment.
11. Resort of the Caunittee on the Working of the Monetary System (Radcliffe
Caimittee), London,HMSO,Q'nnd 827, 1959, paragraph 573.
12. See Kydland and Prescott(1977); Fischer (1980) contains a simple
expDsjtion.—21--
tinder such circumstances, the government will have a tendency to choose
inflationary policies even though it recognizes that from the vipoint of the
long run, it has at soma tirr to confront the inflation issue. One way of
avoiding the inconsistency is by structuring the environment so that the
easy option is renoved.
In this vi, rot indexing the econoir is one way of making the inflation
option less attractive. The political will to fight inflation will be
stronger when inflation matters irore.
Interesting as this approach to policy-making is, in the context of
indexation it raises the question of whether inflation is to be treatedas an
evil independent of its costs. Indexing may lower the costs of inflation
evenif it results in a higher inflation rate.
Wnateverthe welfare economics of this type of argument, there is an
underlying political plausibility to the viei that indexation is inflationary
because it makes it easier to adopt inflationary policies.The emphasis
onpolicy choice reinforces the message that there is no inevitable
• thretical link between indexing and inflation. Evidence on the cross-
country association between indexing and inflation is examined in Section IV.
IV. Eirical Evidence.
The irodel of Section II suggested that indexation uld increase the
inflationary irract of adverse supply side disturbances, especially given
policy that links honey growth to the budget deficit. It was alsoemphasized
that policies, can be adopted that ould avoid this association.This section
presents evidence on the relationship beten indexat.ion and the change in
the average inflation rate experienced after the oil shock of1973, for. a
cross-section of forty countries. I interpret the evidenceas bearing on
theimpacteffect ofan inflationary shock.—22—
Table1 lists durrriy variables representing different aspects of
indexation for the forty countries, as of .1974. The dunrny takes the value
one if there was indexation in that aspect of the econoj in 1974 and zero
otherwise. There was no attempt to quantify the extent of indexation: any
pesitive evidence of indexation in a particular area resulted in a drrny
equal to one for that variable. For instance, if tax brackets were indexed,
the tax durmiy is one, even if capital income taxation remained on a nominal
basis.
The table lists sources. Data on indexation of social security is
probably the nost reliable, and that on wages least reliable; it w3uld not
be surprising to discover that wage indexation occurs in all countries.13
There are separate durrmies for bond indexation, present only in Argentina,
Brazil, France, and Israel, and for indexation of any capital market trans-
actions (excluding rents), present in an additional five countries;
For each country, the ratio of the average inflation rate 1974-1978
tothe average inflation rate 1969-1973 was calculated. The logof that ratio,
called LPIR,wasthenusedas the dependent variable in aregression in which
theright hand side variables were the duranies shownin Table 1. The basic
regressionresults are presented in (P1) and (P2) inTable3.
Whatshould we expect to find? The analysis of Section II suggested
unambiguously that all forrr of indexing increase the impact effect on the
price level of an inflationary shock. Subsequent price level reactions were
less clearly affected by indexation, and iftherewas overshooting, indexation
could even stabilize the respanse to a supply shock. What should be seen in
the regressions is primarily the impact effect, which is certainly likely to
13. Cattnents that will improve the accuracy ofthetable are solicited
and will be much appreciated.—23--
bespread out aver several years, of the oil shock. We expect therefore
an inflationaryeffectof indexing,unless peliciesthat avoid this link
were chosen.
Theregressions aresetup to avoid the reverse causation probln.
Simultaneityis roved bymakingthedependentvariable the ratio of the
inflation rate pre and pestthe oil shock,and havingdifferent aspects of
indexationat the time of the shock as the independent variables.
The results presented in Table 3 show that no form of indexation, other
than that on bends, significantly affected canparative inflation performance
after the oil shock)4 The main implication is that the respenses
to the oil shock were probably largely independent of whether there was
indexation in place in 1974.
In the case of bend indexation, the regression tells us basically that
Argentina, Brazil, France and Israel on average had worse relative inflationary
experience in the face of the oil shock than did other countries. It does
appear, since the relative Argentinian inflation rate is a spectacular
outlier, that the result may be attributed to Argentina. However, as (R3)
shows, the other countries do contribute to the significant effect of bend
indexation.
The results shown in Table 3 provide little suppert for the implications
of the model discussed in Section II. There is nothing in that riodel that
1x)nts particularly to bend indexation as the primarylinkbetween iriclexation
and inflation. Indexation ofsocialsecurity should have a similar effect.
The question thusarisesof what the link between bend indexation and the
14. Other regressions run but not reperted included all possible subsets
of the di.nmty variables as independent variables.Inno case did the
coefficient on any variable other than that for bond or capital market
indexation approach significance.—24—
inflationary process is in the four countries)5 rxrnbusch and Fischer (1981)
finda significant associationbetLwcen budget deficitsandmoney growth in
Israel,andAghevliandKhan(1978) have foundsucha linkforBrazil,
rejx)rtngalso on similar findings for Argentina. Whether indexed bonds
play any special role in the association between the budget deficit and
inflation will have to be the subject of future research.
V. Concluding Ccinrnents.
The theoretical developnent of Section II implied that indexation does
ut potential destabilizing mechanisms in place that will worsen the impact
of an inflationary shock, given monetary and fiscal policies that link money
grcwthto the budget deficit. But itwas also emphasized that the link
between inflation and indexing is not inevitable, and tht appropriate policies
can prevent the inflationary shock-cinr-indexing effect on the budget deficit
that is responsible for the result.
The empirical evidence is that countries with bond indexation were
more seriously affected by the oil shock than other countries. For three
of the four countries with bond indexing, there is also evidence of the link
between budget deficits and money growth, which is the central mechanism
of Section II. Whether andwhybond indexing might play a special role
in this regard is a subject for further research.
15. Bond indexation in France has been on a small scale and France does
not reallybelong in thisgroupof four. But it did not seem desirable
to adjust the data shown in Table 1 to reflect riry inccmplete knowledge
of the extent of indexing in acme countries while not making adjustments
for others. I have instead relied entirely on the published data.Table 1
IndexationDurrTaics
Country Wages Taxes Social Investhent Governrrent
V Security V VBonds
Argentina 0 1 1 1 1
Australia 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 1 1 1 o
Belgium 1 O 1 0 0
Bolivia 0 0 1 0 0
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 0 0
Chile 0 1 1 0 0
W1uthia 0 1 1 1 0
Denmark 1 1 1 1 0
Ecuador 0 0 1 0 0
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 1 0 1 1 0
France 1 1 1 1 1
Germany, FR 0 0 1 0 VV 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland 1 1 0 1 1
India 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 0
V 0 0 0 0
Ireland 1 0 1 0 0
Israel 1 1 1 : 1 1
Italy 1 0 1 .0 0
Japan 0 0 1 0 0
SouthKorea 0 0 0 0 0
Mexco 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 0 0
NewZealand 0 0 1 0 0
Norway 1 0 1 0 0
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 1 0 0
SouthAfrica 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 1 0 0
Sweden 0 1 1 1 0
Switzerland 1 1 1 0 0Country Wages Taxes Social Investment Covernment
___________________________ Security Bonds
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0
Thrkey 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 1 0 1 1 0
USA 1 0 1 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 1 0 0
Venezuala 0 0 0 0
Sources: Braun, Anne Romanis (1976), "Indexation of Wages and Salaries in Developed
Economies," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 23 (1),
(March), pp. 226—271.
ConTnittee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Develoinent, (1976), The Adjustment of Personal Income Tax Systens
for Inflation, Paris.
_______________(1975),Indexation of Financial Assets, Paris.
Giersch, Herbert (1975), "Index Clauses and the Fight Against Inflation,"
inEssays on Inflationand Indexation, American fliterprise Institute.
Page, S.A. B. and Sandra Trollope (1974), "An International Survey of
Indexing and Its Effects," National Institute of Economic Review,
70,(Novber), pp. 46-60.
Tanzi, Vito (1980), Inflation andthePersonal Income Tax, (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge).
U.S. DepartmentofHealth, Education, andWelfare(1975), SocialSecurity
ProgramsThroughoutthe Wr1d, (G. P.O. Washington).Table 2
Ciarativc Inflation Pates
Country 1969—73 1974—78 Ratio
Argentina 0.368 2.135 5.802
Australia 0.080 0.116 1.450
Austria 0.065 0.057 0.877
Belgium 0.066 0.075 1.136
livia 0.197 0.100 0.508
Brazil 0.198 0.410 2.071
Canada 0.059 0.089 1.508
Chile 1.391 1.213 0.872
Columbia 0.145 0.236 1.628
Denmark 0.086 0.099 1.151
Ecuador 0.114 0.122 1.070
Egypt 0.048 0.108 2.250
Finland 0.087 0.119 1.368
France 0.077 0.101 1.312
Germany,FR 0.056 0.041 0.732
Greece 0.101 0.141 1.396
Iceland 0.183 0.395 2.158
India 0.114 0.029 0.254
Indonesia 0.181 0.158 0.873
Ireland 0.108 0.146 1.352
Israel 0.176 0.460 2.614
Italy 0.089 0.155 1.742
Japan 0.106 0.073 0.689
South Korea 0.135 0.166 1.230
Mexico 0.100 0.190 1.900
Netherlands 0.073 0.068 0.932
NeZealand 0.086 0.143 1.663
NDrway 0.082 0.085 1.037
Philippines 0.170 0.096 0.565
Ftrtuga1 0.132 0.213 1.614
SouthAfrica 0.075 0.118 1.573
Spain 0.098 0.183 1.867Table 2 (contixiuel)
Countxy 1969-73 1974-78 Ratio
Sweden 0.074 0.097 1.311
Switzerland 0.070 0.029 0.414
Thailand 0.086 0.069 0.802
Turkey 0.130 0.326 2.508
United Kingdom 0.096 0.155 1.615
USA 0.061 O.08& 1.311
Uruguay 0.548 0.598 1.091


































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.Let uppircase letters denote levels o variables aridletterswithout







sothat = + .+ Ut
Setting W =1=P,we obtain (1) in the text.




This implies (2) in th text,
Finally,the rrüney demand equation is
(A3) Mt =Pt.+ z
so-M= +py -2PY+
WithY =1we obtainin the text.
2. Thegovernment budget nstraint is
(7) Mt -Mti+-DtiPtGt +itDti
-Tt
Nowassurrethat a fraction ? of the budget deficit is financed by noney
printingand (1-A) through the issue of debt.—2--
(A4)- = X[PEG + itDti —T.PtYtI
In (A4) we have assumed the level of government spending isfixed,and
that taxes are propertional to nominal incxme (no tax lag is included). Now
linearizing (Al) around assumed stationary values of the interest rate, the
debt, the price level and real outpit, denoted 1, D, P and Y respectively, we
have
(A5)Mt -Mt_i
=X[PG + iDti + itD
-iD—T +-
Usingequation (8) ofthe text:
(A6)Mt -Mti
=X{Pt(G.TY) + Er+- +(l-) — t—l1D
-t-iD+ wz}+A
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